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Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: Upholding the Alien Tort Claims Act
While Affirming American Exceptionalism
by David C. Baluar te
under the ATCA, and a suit of this nature has yet to succeed. It was
in this context that the FTCA entered the ATCA debate.
Congress passed the FTCA in 1946 to provide the framework
for liability of the U.S. government when its agents, acting within
the scope of their employment, committed common law torts. In
1988, Congress amended the FTCA with the Federal Employees
Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act (Westfall Act). The
primary purposes of the Westfall Act were to establish the process
for substituting the United States for federal officials in common
law tort suits, as well as to establish the exclusivity of the FTCA as
a remedy in such suits.
When a federal officer is sued for a common law tort, the
U.S. Attorney General (AG) determines whether he or she acted
within the scope of his or her employment. If the AG certifies the
officer, the United States substitutes itself as the defendant, and the
plaintiff ’s exclusive remedy becomes the FTCA. Although the
FTCA does provide a waiver of sovereign immunity, it includes a
variety of limitations on government liability.
It is likely that the Supreme Court chose Sosa as its first
ATCA case because the United States was party to the suit and the
lower courts had interpreted the FTCA in a way that would compel government liability.

O

JUNE 29, 2004, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
handed down its much awaited decision in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain. This case was of tremendous
importance to human rights activists, and the Court
delivered their wishes by affirming the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA) as a vehicle for bringing international human rights cases
in U.S. courts. It is important, however, to note not only what
activists retained, but what they lost as well.
This decision marked the second time that the highest U.S.
court denied Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez) legal relief
for his 1990 forced abduction from Mexico by the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA). In assessing the Court’s reasoning for
this disappointing end to Alvarez’s search for justice, this article
explores the two major components of the Court’s opinion: one
addressing the ATCA, and the other interpreting the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA). These two parts, when read together, appear
to foreclose ATCA suits against the U.S. government and its agents
for their activities abroad. While it is encouraging that the ATCA
survived its first bout in the Supreme Court, Sosa also dashed hope
for U.S. government accountability through ATCA/FTCA litigation. This affirmation of American exceptionalism must be understood as the setback that it is if activists are to formulate a successful strategy to confront this unfortunate trend in the future.
N

THE STORY OF DR. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
IN 1990, A U.S. FEDERAL GRAND JURY indicted Alvarez for his

THE ATCA/FTCA STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
ATCA, PASSED BY THE FIRST CONGRESS as part of the

alleged participation in the torture and murder of Enrique
Camarena-Salazar (Camerana), a DEA agent, and a federal court
issued a warrant for his arrest. The indictment accused Alvarez of
providing medical treatment to prolong agent Camarena’s life
while members of a drug cartel interrogated him and tortured him
to death. The United States was not successful in petitioning the
Mexican government to deliver Alvarez to U.S. authorities pursuant to the existing extradition treaty, and therefore it resorted to
covert tactics.

THE
Judiciary Act of 1789, provides that “district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.” The Supreme Court said at the time of the
ATCA’s passage that the “law of nations” only encompassed a
modest number of international law violations thought to carry
personal liability: piracy, offenses against ambassadors, and violations of safe conducts.
The ATCA was largely ignored until 1980 when human
rights lawyers applied it in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala. In Filártiga, two
Paraguayan citizens sued Américo Norberto Peña-Irala, also a
Paraguayan citizen, under the ATCA for the torture and murder of
their family member, Joel Filártiga. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit ultimately awarded compensatory and punitive
damages to the Filártigas.
The Filártiga decision sparked a flurry of litigation by human
rights defenders eager to test the bounds of the revived statute.
Significant questions arose as federal courts toiled with the meaning of the ATCA. Jurists disagreed about whether the ATCA provided solely subject matter jurisdiction or whether it also provided
a cause of action. Further, the scope of that cause of action developed into a contentious issue as courts differed on their interpretations of what constituted a “violation of the law of nations.”
It was not long after Filártiga that the first ATCA suit was filed
against the United States. It soon became apparent, however, that
courts would not find the necessary waiver of sovereign immunity

THE FORCED ABDUCTION
Although the alleged crimes occurred in Mexico, Alvarez resided
in Mexico, and an extradition treaty existed between the United States
and Mexico that provided detailed procedures and evidentiary requirements for extradition, the DEA contracted with Mexican nationals to
abduct Alvarez and transfer him to the United States for trial. As
planned, Jose Francisco Sosa (Sosa) and others kidnapped Alvarez
from his home office in Guadalajara, held him overnight in a hotel,
and flew him to El Paso, Texas, the next day, where he was arrested by
federal agents.
Alvarez moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the
existence of an extradition treaty between the U.S. and Mexico
precluded the court’s jurisdiction in a case where the defendant was
forcibly abducted in violation of that treaty. The district court
found merit in Alvarez’s argument and the appeals court affirmed
the judgment in his favor.
In what can only be described as tortured logic, the Supreme
Court reversed the lower courts’ rulings and found that because the
extradition treaty did not explicitly prohibit forced abduction, that
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right was reserved, giving U.S. courts jurisdiction over Alvarez.
The United States ignored requests by the Mexican government to
return Alvarez and proceeded with the trial. The case, however, was
summarily dismissed for insufficiency of evidence against Alvarez.

lower court’s decision on party substitution, and reversed the dismissal of Alvarez’s FTCA claims. The U.S. government and Sosa
appealed the panel’s ruling and the Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing by an en banc court of 11 judges.
On June 3, 2003, the en banc Court upheld the panel’s decision on party substitution, the judgment against the United States
under the FTCA, and the judgment against Sosa for arbitrary
arrest and detention under the ATCA. The court then reversed the
panel’s finding that Sosa was liable for transborder abduction
under the ATCA, holding that a violation of Mexican sovereignty
was not individually enforceable.
Both Sosa and the U.S. government appealed the en banc
court’s decision, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari
and set a hearing date for appeals on the two most controversial
aspects of the Ninth Circuit decision.

THE CIVIL SUIT
Upon his return to Mexico in 1993, Alvarez filed a civil action
against Sosa, five unnamed Mexicans, a Mexican DEA operative, four
American DEA agents, and the United States. The complaint alleged
that those defendants were liable for common law torts, constitutional torts, and torts in violation of the law of nations.
The district court dismissed all of the constitutional claims,
relying on an established line of judicial precedent that prohibits

"While there is certainly reason
to celebrate that the ATCA
survived, there are concerns
regarding the legitimacy of a
statute that holds human
rights violators from other
countries accountable while
guaranteeing immunity for the
United States and its agents."

THE SUPREME COURT RULING
ON MARCH 30, 2004, HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS gathered from
around the country to hear the final arguments in this case, which
had lasted over a decade and had become part of their very consciousness. While all were aware of Alvarez’s personal plight, the
principle concern was the future of the ATCA and human rights
litigation in U.S. courts. The air was thick with tension as the high
court heard arguments on 1) the propriety of the “headquarters
doctrine” in relation to the FTCA’s “foreign activities exception”
and 2) the substance and scope of the ATCA.

THE END OF

THE

“HEADQUARTERS DOCTRINE”

In the first part of its decision, the Supreme Court held that the
U.S. government was not liable under the FTCA for Alvarez’s abduction.
The statutory language of the FTCA includes a “foreign activities exception,” which bars claims arising from acts in a foreign
country. The lower courts had applied the judge-made exception
to this rule known as the “headquarters doctrine,” which permitted liability for acts in a foreign country if federal agents in the
United States played a significant role in planning the acts. The
Supreme Court viewed the doctrine with skepticism because it was
conceivable that any act, no matter how attenuated, could be
traced back to the U.S. government and defeat the original purpose of the “foreign activities exception.”
Ultimately, two considerations by the Court proved fatal to
the “headquarters doctrine.” First, the Court focused on the theory of proximate cause as the only legitimate way to connect planning in the United States to wrongful actions in a foreign country.
The Court expressed concern with the inaccuracy of the proximate
cause calculus, noting that a proximate cause is not necessarily the
exclusive cause of any given harm. In Sosa, for example, it is difficult to know how much of the planning by U.S. officials actually
shaped Sosa’s activities in Mexico.
The Court then considered the fact that the acts themselves
occurred on foreign soil. The language of the “foreign activities
exception” prohibits claims “arising in a foreign country,” compelling the Court to perform a textual analysis to identify the true
intent of Congress. The Court focused on the phrase “arising in,”
and placed it in the context of traditional tort theory. The Court
found that when the FTCA was drafted, it was commonly understood that the law that applied in tort cases was that of the place of
the injury. Following this rationale, the Court held that Congress
intended to bar all claims arising from an injury suffered in another country. Through this reasoning, the Court overruled the “head-

extra-territorial application of the U.S. Constitution on the facts
presented. The claims based on torts arising under common law
and international law remained. The primary vehicles for those
claims were the FTCA and the ATCA.
Another significant development at the district court level
was that, pursuant to the Westfall Act, the United States was substituted for all of the DEA agents. This ruling divided the defendants and the claims into two distinct groups: the ATCA claims
against Sosa and the FTCA claims against the United States.
The district court entered summary judgment for Alvarez on
his ATCA claims against Sosa for state-sponsored, transborder
abduction and arbitrary detention. The court then granted summary judgment for the United States on Alvarez’s FTCA claims,
finding that the apprehension was privileged and not illegal under
the law of that jurisdiction.
Both parties appealed. Sosa claimed that the district court erred
in finding a cause of action under the ATCA, and Alvarez challenged
both the district court’s decision to substitute the United States for
the DEA officials and the dismissal of his FTCA claims.
A three-judge panel in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld Sosa’s liability under the ATCA and the
12

quarters doctrine” and dismissed all FTCA claims against the
United States.

THE SUBSTANCE AND SCOPE OF

THE

arrest and detention of one day, followed by his swift transfer to a
lawful authority, as a factual matter, was not a crime so severe as to
enjoy universal protection.
Ultimately, the Court denied Alvarez relief for his hardship
and injuries. Without the “headquarters doctrine,” Alvarez was
unable to hold the United States or its agents liable for their
actions under the FTCA. Similarly, because the Court was not
compelled to establish a cause of action for arbitrary arrest and
detention under the ATCA on the facts of his case, Sosa escaped
without liability. This case represents an obstacle for other potential ATCA plaintiffs who aspire to file a claim against the United
States or its agents for injuries suffered abroad. While there is certainly reason to celebrate that the ATCA survived, there are concerns regarding the legitimacy of a statute that holds human rights
violators from other countries accountable while guaranteeing
immunity for the United States and its agents.

ATCA

In the second part of its decision, the Supreme Court ruled
that the ATCA did not support Alvarez’s claim that his arbitrary
arrest and detention were violations of the law of nations.
The Court began by ruling that the ATCA was purely jurisdictional in nature and did not provide a statutory cause of action.
The Court found that, although the ATCA provided jurisdiction
to federal courts to hear violations of the law of nations, that body
of law is incorporated into the federal common law, and it is therefore federal common law that provides the cause of action in
ATCA suits.
The Court then explored the implications of this regime. It
found a middle ground between Sosa’s extreme position that the
ATCA’s failure to provide a cause of action made a claim under
that statute impossible, and the appellate court’s view that such a
cause of action could be established based on relatively liberal criteria. The Court held: “Whatever the ultimate criteria for accepting a cause of action subject to jurisdiction under [the ATCA], we
are persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private
claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among
civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when [the
ATCA] was enacted.” The “historical paradigms” the Court refers
to are offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conducts,
and piracy. However, the Court did not provide a specific test to
determine when a norm has attained sufficient “content and
acceptance among civilized nations” to create a cause of action that
can be vindicated under the ATCA. Instead, the Court urged federal courts to make such findings cautiously, giving five reasons for
this strict approach.
First, the Court noted that when the ATCA was passed in
1789, courts believed that common law already existed, and it was
their job to find it. Today we understand that courts make common
law, and this shift could lead to vast disparities in what different
courts interpret to be violations of the law of nations. Second, the
Court looked back to the 1938 case Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
in which the Supreme Court denied the existence of federal “general” common law and emphasized the importance of looking for legislative guidance before exercising the authority to create substantive law. The Court then gave three reasons why the judiciary
should be cautious when treading in the territory of the political
branches of government: it was the job of the legislature to define
new causes of action, there was no congressional mandate granting
that right to the judiciary in this context, and federal courts determining violations of the law of nations would interfere in the foreign affairs powers of the legislature and the executive. The Court
found these five reasons to compel a cautious approach when establishing new causes of action under the law of nations.
The Court then applied this approach to Alvarez’s case and
found that his claim of an international prohibition on arbitrary
arrest and detention—based on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights—did not meet the new standard. The Court held
that Alvarez’s contention that any arrest and detention without
domestic legal authority constituted a violation of international
customary law was too broad. Further, the Court found that his

CONCLUSION
THE UNITED STATES, LIKE MOST OTHER COUNTRIES around the
world, is responsible for human rights abuses committed by its
agents within its national territory. These abuses are dealt with, to
a greater or lesser degree, in domestic fora. However, unlike most
other countries, the United States exercises a great deal of geopolitical power, putting it in a position where it can and does commit human rights abuses on an international scale. Yet, the global
reach of the United States has not been accompanied by global
accountability. The U.S. government has repeatedly rejected judgments entered against it by international institutions, begging the
question of how this international super-power can be checked.
Sosa represented the hope that ATCA/FTCA litigation could
provide a means for that accountability. At the time of this writing, there were numerous human rights litigators crafting new
arguments to circumvent Westfall substitution and identify
another waiver of sovereign immunity under the ATCA.
Notwithstanding their efforts, we must develop new strategies and
focus our resources on other efforts to confront American exceptionalism under the ATCA.
Two important cases against ExxonMobile and Unocal, both
U.S.-based private energy companies, were on hold in Washington,
D.C. and California federal courts pending the Supreme Court’s
decision in Sosa. These cases, regarding Exxon’s alleged human
rights abuses in Indonesia and Unocal’s alleged abuses in Burma, are
currently going forward. In addition, claims against the Titan
Corporation for its complicity in torture carried out in its detention
facilities in Iraq were recently filed in federal courts in Washington,
D.C. and California. Although it was a great blow when the Court
virtually foreclosed future litigation against the U.S. government
for its activities abroad under the ATCA, the ability to sue U.S.based corporations would certainly boost the statute’s legitimacy in
the eyes of the international community.
Despite the exciting potential for future cases under the
ATCA, we must acknowledge the inherent limitation placed on
ATCA litigation against the United States by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Sosa. The Court missed an opportunity to promote
international norms that apply to all countries; but this cannot
deter activists. Continued reporting, lobbying, and litigation are
necessary to shed light on U.S. government activity and develop a
consensus within the United States that American exceptionalism
HRB
must end.
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